HEIDEGGER AND INDIAN THINKING:
THE HERMENEUTIC OF A “BELONGING-TOGETHER” 
OF NEGATION AND AFFIRMATION by VALLOORAN, Jaison D.
Comparative Philosophy 6.1 (2015)  VALLOORAN 
Comparative Philosophy Volume 6, No. 1 (2015): 111-128 
Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 
www.comparativephilosophy.org 
 
  
HEIDEGGER AND INDIAN THINKING: 
THE HERMENEUTIC OF A “BELONGING-TOGETHER”  
OF NEGATION AND AFFIRMATION 
 
JAISON D. VALLOORAN 
 
 
ABSTRACT: According to Heidegger the questioning of Being is unique to western 
philosophical tradition, however we see that the hermeneutic of Being is explicit in inter-
cultural context of thinking. Understanding Brahman as “one” and “the same” Śankara 
speaks together with Heidegger the same hermeneutic of ontological monism. Due to the 
reason that there is no explicit terminological equivalent of the word ‘Being’ in Śankara’s 
thinking, the hermeneutic of Śankara’s ontological understanding of Brahman and its 
distinction as “Saguna” and “Nirguna” are not sufficiently explored. In an inter-cultural 
ontological context, it is important not to insist on terminological equivalence, but to search 
for hermeneutic depth. Similarly Madhyamaka-Buddhism of Nāgārjuna describes the 
universe as totally devoid of reality, called ‘Śūnya’ or void, which is an expression of nihilism; 
it is comparable to Heidegger’s observation of the concealing of Being as “nihil”. The 
hermeneutic of these explicit ontological characters of Being, as concealment and un-
concealment allow us to discover a sabotaging brotherhood, because the nihil and something 
are ontologically two essential sides of the same thinking.  
Keywords: Heidegger, Śankara, Nāgārjuna, Inter-cultural Ontology, Indian Philosophy 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Philosophies give explanations of the world, of “what” of beings, and set norms for 
the right relationships between human beings. Therefore it is an exclusive property of 
mankind; still it is an intellectual engagement in an individual culture in its highest 
level. And language is the expression of this cultural impact, hence the medium of 
philosophizing. Inspired from Jaspers’ understanding of axial age [‘Weltachse’] Mall 
attributes the origin of philosophy to India, China and Europe (Mall 1989). However, 
the new globalized world becomes increasingly inter-cultural, i.e., the thinking itself 
turns out to be inter-cultural; as the result the thinking initiates the necessity of an  
“inter-cultural philosophy”. It is a global attempt and necessity, aroused from the 
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need of integrating other cultures into one’s own philosophical thinking and thus 
creating an intercultural perspective, rather mere comparison of existing ways of 
thinking. Nevertheless, the philosophies always wanted to consider ontological, 
epistemological, and ethical questions relatively independent from their own cultural 
environments. These contrasts become clearer, when the thinkers like Heidegger 
terms the metaphysics, nihilism and etc., as exclusive properties of western 
philosophical tradition. Simultaneously he advocates ‘the thinking’ as an activity of 
mankind around the world. Hence, the hermeneutic becomes increasingly relevant in 
the realm of thinking.   
  Etymologically speaking the term ‘hermeneutics’ is derived from the Greek word 
‘ἑρµηνεύω’ [hermeneuō], meaning ‘to translate’ or ‘to interpret’. However, it is 
widely accepted that the term ‘ἑρµηνεία’ [hermeneia] was introduced into philosophy 
through the well-known title of Aristotle’s work ‘De Interpretatione’ [On 
Interpretation]. Henceforth, we step into the horizon of interpretation, which also 
stands in relation with the folk etymology. According to the Greek mythology, 
Hermes [‘Ἑρµῆς’], the ‘messenger of the Gods’ brings the ‘message’, thereby he 
mediates between the Gods and between the Gods and men. For him, the inherent 
message was of primarily importance, which is obviously a question of interpretation 
of the coined words. Based on this, the early Greek view on language was formed, i.e., 
the language, consisting of signs is able to lead to truth or to falsehood. Similarly, 
Socrates proclaims that the words have the power to reveal or conceal and can deliver 
messages in an ambiguous way (Hoy, 1981). This is the context, where the 
hermeneutics, as the conditions of possibility for symbolic communication as such, 
enters into philosophical thinking. This is also the basis of our use of the term as well 
as the basis of ontological turn in hermeneutics in the mid-1920s, which was elicited 
in thinking by Heidegger‘s ‘Sein und Zeit’ and later explored further by Hans-Georg 
Gadamer and so on. Subsequently, hermeneutic becomes a task in thinking, i.e., to 
explore the deepest conditions for symbolic interaction, which is able to go beyond 
the barriers of culture, consequently the barriers of technical terms in language. In an 
intercultural context, such a hermeneutic of philosophical questioning turns to be the 
tread that binds every philosophical engagement of human beings around the world. 
The hermeneutic of thinking is multi-facetted; it is capable of answering to the needs 
of the polylogues in fields of systematic questioning in philosophy and 
simultaneously it presents itself as a valid alternative to euro-centrism and the 
separatism of philosophy. Moreover this is a historic-critical method, which creates 
fresh views on the history of philosophy in comparison with similar thinking. 
Therefore, so many are the proponents of this globally emerging dimension of 
thinking, such as Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, Heinz Kimmerle, Ram Adhar Mall, Franz 
Martin Wimmer, Jacques Derrida and so on. 
    Taking into account, what has been historically [first] put forward, the terms like 
‘metaphysics, ontology and epistemology’ are undoubtedly the exclusive properties 
of western thinking. However, apart from this historical belongingness Heidegger 
recognizes an intrinsic conceptual relation of such terms with western thinking. It 
becomes explicit in Heidegger’s attempts to understand, thereby also to criticize the 
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metaphysics and nihilism as the sole product of western intellectual tradition. In this 
sense, it is not an exaggeration to note that the contemporary thinking in India lets 
itself often to coin in terms of western set standards, for, the Indian thinking is 
categorised frequently under the terms like metaphysics, ontology, epistemology and 
so on.1 Thereby, it is forgotten that we frame the originality of a particular thinking in 
terms of set norms and standards of the west, for which this thinking is not created. 
Hence, it becomes relevant that the hermeneutic of thinking is to be asserted, not the 
translations of set standards, for, translations are the interpretations of a particular 
cultural experience in the frame of another culture. For example, the question of 
being and the term ‘Being’ is of course an exclusive property of western thinking. 
The thinking in India never experienced being as experienced by Aristotle in his 
“science of being qua being” or in Platonic perplexity about ‘being and non-being’ or 
as an explicit counterpart to Wolf’s conception of ‘ontology’. However Halbfass 
(1993) asserts that the conception of Being in its very original sense plays an essential 
and undeniable role in Indian thought (Halbfass 1993, 21), whether it is called 
‘Brahman’ or ‘Sat’. In the long tradition of western ontological thinking we see a 
unique attempt of reintroducing the question of Being in the works of Martin 
Heidegger, especially at the beginning of his celebrated work Being and Time. 
According to Heidegger (2001), since its origin, the fundamental question of 
philosophy is nothing but the question of Being. He argues further, the long history of 
western ontological tradition since Plato and Aristotle is based on prejudices against 
the understandings of Being (Heidegger 2001, 02) that the ontological understandings 
since Plato and Aristotle consider Being, as the ‘Highest’, i.e. causa prima, the cause 
of all the beings. To be the ‘Highest’ means, to enclose all the attributes of time and 
space in its highest level; it should be then the superlative, the perfection. Due to this 
most general character, the question of Being remains for Heidegger primarily 
unexplored in the long history of western ontology. Therefore Heidegger describes in 
his Being and Time that the fundamental question of Being remains forgotten [die 
Seinsvergessenheit] (Heidegger 2001, 02). 
  According to Heidegger Being can be understood neither in the horizon of time 
nor in the horizon of space, because Being should form the fundament even for space 
and time. The beings are on the other hand understood in the horizon of time and 
space. Therefore, Being is neither eternal nor non-eternal; Being is neither something 
nor nothing; Being is not the creator, nor the superlative, nor the perfect being. It is 
evident that the conventional ontology understands Being often as causa prima or as 
causa sui, then the conventional ontology perceives Being in the horizon of time and 
space. This understanding of Being as causa prima or as causa sui is the typical 
                                                
1 Simultaneously it is also to be noted that the critics point out that the reception of terms from other 
culture background is a process of development, i.e., the language grows by adapting such terms, 
which can be cross-traditionally jointly concerned and can be addressed from distinct perspectives 
from different traditions. Accepting this view and its necessity in the process of growing, the point of 
our concern is concentrated on the growing tendencies of neglecting the vital cultural background of a 
term, while translating this into an alien cultural framework. In other words in such translations the 
inherent hermeneutic of a term gets neglected, while the words are getting translated. 
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character of western metaphysics. Then, what is Being? Heidegger understands Being 
as “one” and the “same” and to be this whole pervasive “one” and the “same” means, 
to comprise the “nihil” and “something”. Subsequently, it goes beyond the 
fundamental dividing norms of negation and affirmation, i.e., the categorization; this 
is the “belonging-together” of Being and the thinking, which is implicit in the western 
tradition since Parmenides. Hence, Heidegger (2006) asserts the “belonging-together” 
[“Zusammengehören”] of Being and human being [Sein und Da-sein] (Heidegger 
2006, 37), which goes beyond any hierarchy or categorization. In terms hermeneutic 
of intercultural ontological thinking, it is the same “belonging-together”, that Śankara 
assertively proclaims as the “A-dvaitam”, i.e., the ‘Non-duality’ of Brahman and 
Ātman. 
 The term Being is western, and there is no explicit equivalent to this term in 
Indian thinking, other than the two different Sanskrit synonyms for the Greek word 
‘έστι’: ‘as’ or ‘asti’ and ‘bhu’ or ‘bhavati’. In the second Sanskrit synonym [bhu / 
bhavati], Halbfass (1993) points out a fascinating etymological affinity with the 
Greek concept of ‘φύσις’ (Halbfass 1993, 22), that bhu / bhavati expresses the 
potentiality, i.e., the becoming. This is similar to the becoming of a blossom, which 
Heidegger understands under Greek concept of ‘φύσις’. But in Indian thinking, both 
these synonyms are rarely understood in the sense of ‘α-λήθεια’ or ‘λόγος’, as the 
Greek understood the word ‘έστι’. Hence, it is the hermeneutic, i.e., the hermeneutic 
of Being as ‘one’ and ‘the same’, as ‘nihil’ and ‘something’, which goes beyond any 
categorizations of time and space or the subject object relationship that plays a central 
and pervasive role in Indian thinking, especially in Śankara’s understanding of 
Advaita-Vedānta, whether it is called “Brahman” or “Sat’. 
 
2. THE CONVENTIONAL ONTOLOGY:  
BEING BENEATH TIME AND SPACE 
 
According to Heidegger those prejudices against the concept of Being since Plato and 
Aristotle are based on the partial understandings of Being and on various attempts to 
define the concept of Being in the history of philosophy. In the history of western 
philosophy Being is rightly understood as the most general and therefore the emptiest 
term. According to the Greek and scholastic Logic, a definition is only possible, if the 
defined-something can be differentiated and further be specified. However, Being as 
the most general term, allows room neither for specifying nor for differentiating, i.e., 
Being does not allow any definition. It also means, that our Logic, which is based on 
the methods of induction and deduction, is not applicable on Being, but on beings 
alone. Being remains as the most general and therefore indefinable term that everyone 
understands in this or that way. Hence, the question of Being remains for Heidegger 
(2001) primarily unexplored in the history of western ontology. Consequently, 
Heidegger describes in his that the fundamental question of Being remains unattended 
and forgotten (Heidegger 2001, 02 f.). 
 According to the ontological understandings since Plato and Aristotle, Being is 
considered to be the “Highest”, i.e. causa prima, the cause of every beings. In the 
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language of religion this ‘causa prima’ is ‘God’. Therefore in the traditional and 
middle-age ontology Being is identified primarily with God, as ‘causa prima’ or as 
‘causa sui’ or as ‘ipsum esse subsistens’. This identification of Being with ‘causa 
prima’ or with ‘causa sui’ is explicit in the ontological proofs of St. Anselm, where 
he comes with his profound arguments to prove the necessary existence of God, as 
the ontological highest. However, this understanding of Being that Being is the 
highest something or Being is the perfection of every relative existence, comes in 
Nietzsche’s thinking to its necessary end. In Nietzsche’s thinking (1977), God is dead; 
the famous, as well as notorious words from Nietzsche proclaim: “God is dead, we 
have killed him. You and I are his murderers” [“Gott ist tot, Wir haben ihn getötet. 
Ihr und Ich seid seine Mörder”.] (Nietzsche 1977, 125 f. and Heidegger 1980, 250). 
What do these words from Nietzsche ontologically mean? Of course, it means that 
metaphysical God is dead and nothing more, if we do not explore it further. 
 In those words, we see primarily a proclamation that “God is dead”. Nietzsche 
does not stop there; he goes on screaming, “we have killed him”. Does Nietzsche 
want to assert the same fact by repetition? No, on the other hand, he proclaims that it 
is not so; that the almighty God himself is disappeared from his pervasive presence, 
but he was killed by human (Seubert 2000, 186). Then Nietzsche asserts by repeating 
that you and I have killed him. It is to be noted that Nietzsche does not want to assert 
the fact, that God is dead, but the fact that he was killed. It means first of all that you 
and I are capable of killing God. To kill someone means, to be able to exercise power 
on him; and the human being is able to exercise power on God. This ultimate power, 
which provides the human being the supremacy over God, is the recognition that the 
very concept of God is a creation of human intellect. According to Heidegger’s 
thinking (1980), Plato with his concept of an ideal world paved the way for God in 
philosophy; this is the philosophical turning point, where the Greek ontological 
beginning turns out to be metaphysical. Nietzsche asserts the same that God 
sovereigns the philosophy since Plato; and the human being, who is able to go beyond 
the concept of God, is named by Nietzsche as “Übermensch” [Superman] (Heidegger 
1980, 250-251). Secondly, Nietzsche’s proclamation pre-supposes a time without 
God, i.e., God is for Nietzsche no more eternal. It means ontologically, the concept of 
God is understood in the horizon of time, i.e. the ‘time’ becomes more fundamental 
than God. Thirdly, the proclamation “God is dead” means that the negation [Nihil] is 
in God itself. Ontologically speaking, this is the historical moment, when Being 
becomes explicit as nothing [Nihil] and as something, consequently negation and 
affirmation are in Being itself; they are the two sides of the same coin. 
 Therefore, Heidegger understands in those words of Nietzsche not the God of 
religions, but the long-established understandings of Being as causa prima and as 
causa sui. If Being is understood in the horizon of time, it is no more Being, but only 
a being, perhaps the highest being [das höchste Seiende]. God understood as causa 
prima or as causa sui can be conceivably this highest being, but not Being. Being can 
be understood neither in the horizon of time nor in the horizon of space, because 
Being should form the fundament even for space and time; if not, it is not Being. The 
beings are on the other hand understood in the horizon of time and space. For this 
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reason, Being is neither eternal nor non-eternal, Being is neither something nor 
nothing; in terms of Indian philosophy it is nēti nēti, [not this, not this]. The 
conventional ontology understands Being often as causa prima or as causa sui; 
subsequently it understands Being in the horizon of time and space. Even though the 
eastern thinking is framed neither in terms of western metaphysics nor in terms of 
nihilism, it is the same “highest something”, that is understood by the term ‘Saguna 
Brahman’ [Brahman with qualities], because all qualities are ultimately the qualities 
of time and space. 
 
3. THE “BELONGING-TOGETHER” [“ZUSAMMENGEHÖREN”] 
 
Heidegger attempts in his Being and Time to reintroduce the ancient Greek 
understandings of Being [Parmenides], so that the modern thinking may be able to 
overcome its nihilistic inclinations by overcoming the metaphysical, traditional 
concept of Being as causa sui. According to Heidegger, what is explicit in 
Nietzsche’s denial is the understanding of Being as Nihil, Being as nothing, i.e., the 
nothingness of Being. In the pre-Socratic ontological understandings ‘Nihil’ was 
immanent in the thinking of Being, but later, since the beginning of Platonic 
metaphysics this vital all-encompassing understanding of Being was forgotten, 
because the metaphysics understood Being as the superlative alone, as the highest of 
positives. Therefore reckoning with the pre-Socratic understandings on Being 
Heidegger (2006) aims at reintroducing the phenomenon of Being as a new beginning 
for thinking, where he asserts the “belonging-together” [“Zusammengehören”] of 
Being and human being [Sein und Da-sein], (Heidegger 2006, 37) as seen by 
Parmenides. According to Heidegger’s Parmenides interpretation the thinking and 
Being belong together and it is the same and belongs to the same (36). It is the 
fundamental teaching of “belonging-together” at the beginning, that Parmenides 
asserts Being and thinking [thinking denotes the thinking being, i.e. human being] as 
the one and the same. According to Heidegger, the metaphysics understands 
‘belonging-together’ as togetherness, where one is categorized under the other or vice 
versa; hence it paves way to the hierarchy, an order and an analytical system; this is 
the typical characteristic of the metaphysics, where Being cannot, but be only the 
highest (36-37). But in Parmenides the point of assertion was the ‘belonging-together’, 
which goes beyond any categorization, any order, i.e., the system building mechanism, 
that ultimately the thinking and Being are understood as the same! Therefore 
Heidegger interprets Being belongs to us, to the human, that Being and human being 
belong to each other, which brings the meaning of Heidegger’s understanding of 
‘belonging-together’ of Being and beings to its vital explication (40). 
 According to Heidegger (1993) in every translation the original cultural 
experience stays behind as non-transferable, because every experience of language is 
fundamentally an experience of its culture. Hence, in every translation the words are 
translated, but not the fundamental cultural experience behind the language 
(Heidegger 1993, 187). Therefore Heidegger insists that every phenomenological-
critical method must take this fundamental experience of language into account. The 
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absence of such an experience is also evident in translating the German word 
‘zusammengehören’ into ‘belonging-together in English. The German word 
‘zusammengehören’ is a combination of two words, ‘zusammen’ [together] and 
‘gehören’ [belong]. Interestingly enough, the verb ‘hören’, means to ‘hear’ and the 
pre-syllable ‘ge’ is used to build its participle form, means the participle form of 
above-mentioned verb will be ‘gehört’. It means the word ‘gehören’ [belong] stands 
in relation with ‘hören’ [hear] and these words have the word ‘gehört’ as its participle 
form. In this context, it is to be noted that Heidegger is attributed to have a pictorial 
presentation of the experience of ‘belonging-together’ in the idea of listening to 
something together, in which both listening parties meet as similar and equal partners. 
This notion of similarity and equivalence goes beyond any kind of categorization or 
system-building-mechanism of metaphysical thinking. The binding between these 
two parties is only the essential mutual belonging. This is how Heidegger understands 
the standpoint of Parmenides, when he asserts the “belonging-together”. The 
metaphysics on the other hand stresses on ‘zusammen’, which denotes a belonging of 
something into something else. In such metaphysical ‘belonging’ [zusammen] the 
categorization, i.e., the fundamental feature of every system building mechanism, 
becomes explicit. In order to stress the togetherness [not the belonging] Heidegger 
(2006) writes the word ‘zusammengehören’ as ‘zusammengehören’ (Heidegger 2006, 
38), subsequently he describes, in human prevails a belonging to Being, which 
belonging hears Being (39). 
 
4. ŚANKARA’S A-DVAITA [THE NON-DUALOTY]  
AND “BELONGING-TOGETHER” 
 
In terms of intercultural ontological thinking, it is the hermeneutic of same 
‘belonging-together’ between Brahman and Ātman, that Śankara assertively 
proclaims as the “A-dvaita”, the ‘Non-duality’. The exposition of Śankara’s Advaitam 
encloses the unconditional and difference-less unity of Brahman [the Absolute] and 
Ātman [the individual self], where the individual self is nothing but the Absolute 
itself. However, it seems due to Avidya that the individual exists. The strict 
ontological conception of Brahman in the Advaita statement endorses Brahman as the 
‘one’ and ‘the same’ that there is no room for differences. Brahman is difference-less 
in itself and the only true entity, subsequently Brahman is neither “Sajātīya” 
[homogeneous] nor “Vijātīya” [heterogeneous]. The Advaita thinking illustrates 
simultaneously Brahman in ontological relevant terms like, truth [Sat], consciousness 
[Chit] and bliss [Ānanda] that the “Sat-Chit-Ānanda” alone is accepted to be the 
positive expressions of Brahman; under all other conditions the ultimate Brahman is 
to be described as “neti, neti” [not this, not this] alone (Potter 1998, 15 ff). 
Understanding Brahman in positive and negative terms Advaita opens itself towards 
an ontological completeness, where the difference-less ultimate encompasses; this is 
where the mutual belonging between the absolute [Brahman] and the individual 
[Ātman] becomes prominent. 
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 However the western metaphysics, understanding Being as the highest being [das 
höchste Seiende] tends to categorize, that the ‘belonging-together’ of Being and Da-
sein as seen by Parmenides, is forgotten. The understanding of Being as the highest 
being pre-supposes the existence of lower beings, hence there is the hierarchy. In 
such hierarchy there is no ‘belonging-together’ in its original sense, but it is the 
categorization, which is the expression of system-building-mechanism. Subsequently 
in any attempt of categorization Being is no more Being in the sense of this 
belonging-together; categorization stands always for a hierarchy, the hierarchy of the 
highest being and the relative beings [das Seindeste und die Seiende]. One can here 
rightly argue that according to Śankara Brahman is pre-supposed for the existence of 
Jīva, but the existence of Jīva is never a condition for Brahman. Nevertheless such 
arguments are based on the perceived difference between Brahman and Jīva, i.e., in 
Vyāvahārika-sattā [empirical existence]; and one forgets that any such difference 
pervade in Pāramārthika-sattā [absolute existence]; there is the difference-less 
Brahman alone. However, point of critique should be understood from another 
perspective, that according to Heidegger the human being and Being are never one 
and the same in all its aspects; subsequently one is right to assume that Heidegger 
propagates an ontological monism and whereas Śankara advocates an absolute 
monism. 
 In Śankara’s thinking, the hermeneutic of the question of Being plays 
undoubtedly a central and cardinal role than most of the philosophical streams in 
India. Nevertheless none of these systems including Advaita-Vedānta deals with the 
question of Being explicitly, due to the fact that this un-spelled phenomenon of Being 
is understood immanent in Brahman, immanent in ‘Sat-chit-Ānanda’. Hence the word 
‘Being’ comes rarely in its explicit projection (Vallooran, 2013, 185); nonetheless the 
hermeneutic alone. Heidegger’s understanding of Being goes beyond the time and 
space, hence it goes beyond all attributes. Researching on intercultural ontology, if it 
is not this un-spelled phenomenon of Being, what else shall we understand under the 
hermeneutic of Nirguna-Brahman, the very primary concept of something, that is 
immanent in everything and without any qualities of time and space? Ontologically 
speaking this conception of Nirguna-Brahman is nothing but the un-spelled 
understanding of Being! The hermeneutic of ontology stands assertively on a 
‘belonging-together’ [‘zusammengehören’], the ‘belonging-together’ of Ātman and 
Brahman; this is the advaitam, the non-duality, which goes beyond any categorization. 
 
5. THE HERMENEUTIC OF ‘α-λήθεια’, ‘SAT’ AND BEING 
 
Every categorization pre-supposes a fundamental duality; essentially it is nothing but 
a subject-object-relationship; and every subject-object-relationship is nothing but the 
categorization. Such subject-object-relationship is the essence of metaphysics, which 
reigns the thinking since its origin in Plato’s world of ideas. The human being that is 
tied up in the cave understood first of all the shadows for the sole reality. This is the 
first un-concealment of phenomenon. Once he turns back, he is able to see the world 
behind him in the light of fire, a further un-concealment. On search of the ultimate 
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reality he makes himself free for a better sight. Finally he comes out of the cave and 
sees the sun and the world outside in the sunlight. According to Plato this is the 
ultimate un-concealment, the ultimate truth, the ‘α-λήθεια’ (Heidegger 1975, 224).  
According to this narration, the human being must direct himself towards the higher 
truths of the sun, so that this ultimate un-concealment, and thus the ultimate truth may 
disclose to him. Heidegger recognizes two fundamental, metaphysical characteristics 
in this narration of Plato, i.e., there are twofold dependencies for Plato’s 
understanding of truth. First, according to Plato the human being must direct himself 
towards the higher truth of the sun, so that the truth may disclose to him. This means 
any recognition of truth is result of human effort; this is the first problem of 
metaphysics that metaphysics set norms for human dealings. Secondly truth is that, 
which is revealed, i.e., mere un-concealment of phenomenon. In the Greek origin, 
especially Parmenides explores ‘α-λήθεια’ as concealment and un-concealment. 
Reckoning with Parmenides Heidegger criticizes Plato’s understanding of ‘α-λήθεια’ 
as mere un-concealment of phenomenon. According to Heidegger the term ‘α-λήθεια’ 
is un-concealment and concealment as well. The Greeks have discovered the word 
αλήθεια for this revealing. The Romans translate this with ‘veritas’, that we say 
‘truth’ and usually understand it as the correctness of an idea (Heidegger 1977, 10), 
and we in the context of Indian thinking understand this as ‘Sat’.  
 Influenced by this metaphysical understanding of Plato, we proclaim something 
as true; if it is right, if the spelled out reality corresponds to the imagined or 
understood reality. Then the truth becomes a mere inter-relationship between our 
understanding and the verbally spelled out picture. Subsequently, ‘α-λήθεια’ as 
concealment and un-concealment is reduced into ‘right’ and ‘false’, which is the 
matter of subjective perception and objective announcement alone [adaequatio 
intellectus et rei]. This is the sense of Plato’s ultimate un-concealment, when the 
human being directs himself to the higher truth of the sun. The human being, who 
stands against the world of objects, is the subject, which is capable of knowing. Due 
to this unique metaphysical positioning of human being as the subject capable of 
knowing the world of objects, Heidegger assumes that the ‘subject-object-thinking’ 
rules the metaphysics, since Plato. Plato’s understanding of the human being, who 
directs himself towards the higher truths of the sun, is the projection of human 
subjectivity in recognizing the truth. Since Plato, the metaphysics proclaims 
something to be true, if the spell out reality corresponds to the imagined or 
understood reality. Later in modern times we see that the same ‘subject-object-
thinking’ rules the whole world of sciences in the form of “cogito ergo sum” that the 
thinking subject stands against the whole universe of objects. Heidegger recognizes in 
modern technique the ultimate expression of this ‘subject-object-thinking’, i.e., 
according to him the triumph of pervasive nihilism.  
 Restricting our thinking strictly to Indian philosophical tradition we understand 
the term ‘truth’ literarily as ‘Sat’. ‘Sat’ is Being as well as truth in Indian thinking, 
that the term ‘Satya’ finds its etymological roots in Sat. Subsequently ‘Sat’ is not to 
understand in the sense of right and false, rather in the sense of concealment and un-
concealment of the ultimate reality called Brahman. According to Advaita-Vedānta 
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Brahman is understood as ‘Sat-Chit-Ānanda’ [Being-consciousness-bliss]. In the 
language of western ontology, Being as ‘Sat’ finds itself integrated and immanent in 
Brahman. If ‘Sat’ is understood in the sense of ‘α-λήθεια’, it is eternal. However, if 
‘Sat’ is understood in the sense of being right and being false, then at the end we have 
to declare that ‘Sat’ itself is subject to change, which cannot be the fact. Exploring 
‘Sat’ ontologically the following aspects are evident: 
 (1) Sat is understood in Brahman, even though Brahman is understood as Sat and 
Sat is understood as Brahman. Undoubtedly Sat itself is Brahman, means further, that 
Sat and Brahman does not know any ontological difference, i.e. ontologically 
Brahman ≡ Sat; and Sat ≡ Brahman. 
 (2) Though there is an ontological equation between Brahman and Sat in absolute 
level [Pāramārthika-sattā] of reality, Sat is understood as under or immanent in 
Brahman in empirical level [Vyāvahārika-sattā], otherwise it may pave the way to 
duality. Then Brahman becomes the Saguna, understood in the horizon of space and 
time. 
 (3) Knowledge of Brahman is objective [Vedānta sūtra 1.1.3.]. So that a piece of 
knowledge could be understood as objective, it shall be expressive in words 
(Heidegger 1975, 126), i.e., is the Vedas. Heidegger (2001) expresses the same 
ontologically that the language is the ‘house’ of Being. And more interestingly 
Parmenides asserts, ‘α-λήθεια’ and ‘λόγος’ belong together (Heidegger 2001, 219). 
 (4) According to western ontological thinking the ultimate truth [‘α-λήθεια’] is 
beyond the horizon of temporality. In Advaita-Vedānta ‘Sat’ is equal to eternal 
Brahman, means also beyond the horizon of temporality. [“Brahmasatyam, 
Jaganmithya, Jivo Brahmaiva na Aparah”.] 
 (5) Analysing chronologically we see that the term ‘Sat’ and ‘A-sat’ appears in 
Rgveda for the first time, that the hymn of nāsadīya (Rgveda X.129.) discusses over a 
time, where there was neither ‘Sat’ nor ‘A-Sat’(Sprung 1995, 111). Later the 
Taittiriya-Upanishad describes, at the beginning there was only ‘A-Sat’ and 
interestingly enough the ‘Sat’ knows ‘A-sat’ as its origin (112), means, Nirguna 
Brahman is fundamental than Saguna Brahman. The understanding that ‘Sat’ is prior 
to ‘A-Sat’ is seen for the first time in Chandogya-Upanishad (112). 
 Inspired by the thinking of Parmenides Heidegger translates ‘α-λήθεια’ 
ontologically as “un-concealment” [Un-verborgenheit]. Linguistically it is due to the 
fact that the Greek alphabet ‘α’ in α-λήθεια is used as a privation. The hermeneutic of 
this privation is not explicit, if we translate and then understand ‘α-λήθεια’ as ‘truth’. 
Moreover, in such translation the hermeneutic of the concealing and un-concealing 
character of ‘α-λήθεια’ becomes increasingly tributary. That is why Heidegger asserts 
on its ontological implication, i.e., to translate, subsequently understand ‘α-λήθεια’ as 
‘un-concealment’ [Un-verborgenheit]. Interestingly enough this Greek way of 
building privation by using the alphabet ‘α’ is widely practiced in Sanskrit too. The 
very first example is the name ‘A-dvaita’, where the alphabet ‘A’ stands for the 
privation of ‘Dvaita’. So many are the examples, such as; »A-vidya«, »Advayam«, 
»Analpam«, »Avyayam«, and so on (Vallooran 2013, 169). 
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 Further, it is also to be noted, that Parmenides and Śankara (1949) assertively 
reckon, knowledge [Jnāna or Jnāna-mārga] is the only way of liberation. Śankara 
says, in his Upadēsasahasri that the way of liberation is knowledge (Śankara 1949, 
11). In his collection of poems Parmenides points out, that we the human being can 
follow only the way of wisdom. He further advises, we must keep ourselves away 
from ignorance (Kranz 1949, 93-95). Śankara aims nothing less, than keeping us 
away from “Avidya”. According to Parmenides knowledge is Being; non-knowledge 
is non-being (93-95). Subsequently Parmenides and Śankara make a clear distinction 
between knowledge and non-knowledge. Both of them assert that we must keep 
ourselves away from non-knowledge. Due to such striking parallels between these 
two, Karl Reihnhardt (1959) writes, that Parmenides and Śankara show essential 
structural similarities (Reihnhardt 1959, 65). Moreover, Heidegger, Parmenides and 
Śankara assertively stand on a ‘belonging-together’ of Being and human being. 
According to Śankara it is the non-duality between Ātman and Brahman. According 
to Parmenides and Heidegger this is called as the ‘belonging-together’ of Being and 
thinking, i.e., the togetherness of Being and human being; the hermeneutic of 
‘belonging-together’ [‘Zusammengehören’] is also the teaching of Śankara, when he 
proclaims the ‘Advaitam’, i.e. the difference-less oneness (Vallooran 2013, 220). 
 
6. THE CONCEALING AND UN-CONCEALING  
CHARACTER OF BEING 
 
In Heidegger’s essay (1962), ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, we see the 
“bringing-forth” in the sense of revealing stands not only for the artistic and technical 
activities, but also for a “bringing-forth-from-itself”, interpreted in the sense of the 
Greek word ‘φύσις’. Assuming that the ‘φύσις’ is an act of ‘bringing-forth-from-itself 
[which is also a ‘bringing-forth’] shows the urge towards the ‘efficient cause’ 
[‘λέγειν’, ‘λόγος’ German ‘Überlegen’]; and ultimately it stands for the revealing 
[Entbergen] character of Being (Heidegger 1962, 11.). Heidegger interprets Being in 
accordance with the Greek construction as a completed fact, that is determined 
differently than the metaphysical understanding. Hence, not only the handcraft 
manufacture, or the artistic and poetical bringing into appearance or concrete imagery 
is a bringing-forth [ποίησις], but ‘φύσις’ also, i.e., the arising of something from out 
of itself, is a bringing-forth. ‘Φύσις’ is indeed ποίησις in the highest sense, for, 
according to Heidegger what presences by means of ‘φύσις’ has the bursting open 
belonging to bringing-forth. In contrast, what is brought forth by the artisan or the 
artist has to do with the presencing [An-wesen] of that, which at any given time comes 
to appearance in bringing-forth. So, according to Heidegger the bringing-forth brings 
hither out of concealment forth into un-concealment, that the bringing-forth comes to 
pass only insofar as something concealed comes into un-concealment. This act of 
coming into un-concealment rests and moves freely within, what we call revealing 
[das Entbergen]. 
 Being, as void [nihil] is grounded in the essence of truth. According to Heidegger, 
what is explicit in the thinking of Nietzsche is nothing, but the ultimate expression of 
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Being as “nihil”, i.e., Being that bears its concealment with itself, hides itself in 
Nietzsche’s thinking. This is the concealment of Being in beings, that Being finds 
itself in the highest stage of its metaphysical, historical character of forgetfulness, 
subsequently it becomes a metaphysical epoché, in which the thinking, especially 
Nietzsche’s thinking is marked with this forgetfulness of Being (Heidegger, 1980, 
253). The overcoming of nihilism means the un-concealment of these hidden 
characteristics of Being, which is essentially an overcoming of Platonic metaphysics. 
Nietzsche’s conception of superman [Übermensch] is the highest expression of the 
concealing character of Being, for, he sustains the truth of beings as a whole. But this 
truth does not show straightforwardly, however it does reflect it off, as if in the art; 
this is the nature of superman, in which Nietzsche experiences Being as the “will to 
power” comes to its explicit expression. Subsequently, the essence of nihilism is not, 
what is explicit in the thinking of Nietzsche alone, but it rests in the history of 
metaphysics as the thinking of ‘ίδέα’, as the denial of Being. In search of the essence 
of this immanent nihilism, we have to assert that the name ‘nihilism’ itself represents 
primarily a “nihil”, a thinking, in which the “nihil” [nothing] becomes essential. 
Heidegger interprets nihilism accordingly, i.e., it is concerned with Being as nothing, 
that means, in its all aspects it is nothing; hence this is an experience of 
conceptualised emptiness. Heidegger argues further that the nihilism itself is founded 
in Being, for, nihilism is the story of the concealing of Being. In the history of 
metaphysics Being as something and as nothing comes apart into its dividend 
explored constitution. This is the essence of Being, which remains un-thought and un-
discussed in nihilism, because nihilism as ‘nihil’ does not realize that the ‘nihil’ is to 
be understood also as a antonym of non-nihil (Heidegger, 1986, 44); subsequently 
they form the two inherent sides of the same thinking, marked with “revealing” 
[entbergen] and “concealing” [verbergen] characteristics of Being. 
 
7. THE CONCEPT OF ŚŪNYATA  
AND THE CONCEALING CHARACTER OF BEING 
 
Coming back to Indian thinking, the Madhyamaka school of Nāgārjuna describes the 
universe as totally devoid of reality, that according to them everything is called 
‘Śūnya’ or void. ‘Śūnya’ or void is the explicit expression of ‘nihil’, that there are the 
nihilistic inclinations comparable to Nietzsche in certain perspectives. In many of the 
comparative studies, this Buddhist school, founded by Nāgārjuna is often described as 
being explicitly nihilistic; consequently a considerable amount of such studies depend 
on the superficial and apparent nihilistic characteristics of this school. This is due to 
the [mis]understanding of the term ‘Śūnya’ or ‘Śūnyata’, which is used to describe the 
indeterminable and indescribable reality in Madhyamaka school. In western nihilistic 
tradition, especially in the understanding of Nietzsche, the term nothing is a 
hypothetical possibility, that can neither conceived as a reality in the sense of ‘is’ nor 
understood as a antonym of ‘non-is’. Hence, it is a kind of conceptual emptiness, 
which would lead to nothing; a conceptualised ‘nihil’ alone. Every possibility of 
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describing or understanding is unknown to this conceptual emptiness, that it can 
neither be affirmed nor be negated, because it is just ‘nihil’ alone. 
 It is evident that Nāgārjuna developed his theory of Śūnya-vāda from teaching of 
Buddha on dependent origination, called Pratitya-samutpāda. According to this 
theory the reality lacks Sva-bhāva, i.e., ‘own nature’. In the context of explicit 
historical rivalry between Buddhism and Vedānta, it is also to be noted that Sva-
bhāva is intrinsically linked with understanding Brahman in Upanishad, that 
according to them the [Saguna]Brahman is understood as the summum bonum, i.e., 
the perfection of Sva-bhāva. Buddhism, which rejects Brahman should subsequently 
assert on the lack of Sva-bhāva. Nāgārjuna comes forth with his dialectical brilliance 
to negate the conception of Sva-bhāva and thereby also the theories of Satkārya-vāda 
and the Asatkārya-vāda proposed by Sāmkhya and Nyāya schools respectively; and 
even Ajāti-vāda and Vivarta-vāda are essentially immune to Nāgarjuna’s dialectics. 
The dialectical approach of Nāgārjuna pre-supposes explicitly the Pratitya-
samutpāda or dependant origination, that everything is originated depending on 
something else; that there is a cause for every effect and every cause is an effect of a 
previous cause. Therefore, everything is originated dependently, that there is no room 
for an eternal Sva-bhāva in the teaching of Pratitya-samutpāda. Lack of this Sva-
bhāva is described as Śūnya. Nāgārjuna describes Śūnya in his Śūnyathasaptati that 
everything, -self, not-self, both self and not-self- being nameable thing, are like 
nirvāna, devoid of essential nature. Since there is no essential nature in things, causes 
and conditions, whether taken separately or collectively, everything is empty (E11; 
T24) (Potter 2002, 135). Further, Nāgārjuna asserts that Śūnya is itself Śūnya, that it 
lacks the Sva-bhāva. Does this mean that Nāgārjuna understands Śūnya as 
conceptualized emptiness and subsequently holds a position comparable to Nietzsche? 
 The understanding of Nāgārjuna is not exactly about this conceptualized 
emptiness. Instead, the term Śūnya provided Nāgārjuna the best possible way to 
express on the real nature of intrinsic reality as such, that the intrinsic reality as such 
is understood as something that is indeterminable and indescribable. Hence, it is to be 
assumed in difference to Nietzsche that Nāgārjuna does not intend to deny the 
intrinsic reality as such, but the apparent phenomenal world perceived in terms of ‘is’ 
and ‘is-not’. According to Nāgārjuna, existence and non-existence, beginning and end, 
better and worse are not actual [tattva], but only practical ways of speaking 
[lōkavyavahāra] (E10; T24) (Potter 2002, 135). Hence, the term ‘Śūnya’ or ‘Śūnyata’ 
stands for the expression of the ultimate reality, which cannot be expressed in terms 
of lōkavyavahāra, i.e., in terms of affirmation and negation. Subsequently, the 
understanding of Nāgārjuna on ‘Śūnya’ becomes something similar to the position of 
‘zero’ in a mathematical scale; that positives and negatives are neutral to it. In context 
of an ontological exploration, it is important to understand that according to 
Nāgārjuna ‘Śūnya’ is the best possible expression of intrinsic reality as such; hence 
the term ‘Śūnya’ never denies the reality as such. Consequently the reality becomes 
something that is to be understood beyond the objectivity and referentiality, which 
can neither be perceived through the perspective possibilities nor understood through 
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cognitive capacities. This reality, being devoid of phenomenal characters, is called 
Śūnya or Śūnyata. 
 In the opinion of S. Dasgupta, Nāgārjuna used the word ‘Śūnya’ or ‘Śūnyatha’ in 
order to designate both phenomenal and trans-phenomenal reality in a somewhat 
technical sense. He adds further that the world is called Śūnya, because it is emptied 
or devoid of any intrinsic nature of its own [Nihsvabhāva] (Dasgupta 1998, 351-352). 
Hence the reality can neither be real, nor be unreal. The indeterminable and 
indescribable real nature, which is called Śūnyatā or voidness, is then beyond the 
possibility of Nāma-rūpa. The Madhyamaka school of thought holds that ‘Śūnya’ is 
the transcendental reality [noumenon] behind the phenomenal one. Subsequently, 
‘Śūnya’ is free from change, from conditionality and from any other phenomenal 
characters. According to Potter empty [Śūnya] is a technical term for Nāgārjuna; 
when he calls something empty he is implying it doesn’t really exist, but he is by no 
means suggesting that it doesn’t seem to exist and that its functioning may well seem 
to occasion results such as misery and pain (Potter 2002, 15). 
 However Śūnyata in its popular and apparent usage is something that is 
intelligible, i.e., in the sense of the negative aspect of ultimate reality, i.e., the 
description of ‘what it is not’. The real nature of object cannot be established by the 
intellect and cannot, therefore, be described. For, that which is real, must be 
independent, i.e., should not depend on anything else for its existence and origination. 
According to S. Dasgupta, it is Śankara, who takes up the popular connotation of the 
word Śūnya as ‘nothing’ while criticising the Śūnya-vāda and consequently he 
condemns the expressive character of ‘nihil’ in ‘Śūnya-vāda’. Śankara argues that a 
philosophical position, which pictures the empirical world as a transitory show of 
non-substantial appearances [Śūnya] is not even worthy of a criticism, because 
absolute unreality of sheer appearances without any underlying reality [Tattva] to 
appear is a self-defeating proposition, which cannot be defended by any instruments 
of valid cognition (Dasgupta & Mohanta 1998, 351). Even though it might for the 
moment look as a misinterpretation from the side of Śankara, he as someone, who 
asserts the unity and realty of Ātman could recognise only the ‘nihil’ in the theories 
of Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna perhaps was not meaning to deny the existence of the 
ultimate reality as such; however it is also true that Nāgārjuna explores the ‘nihil’ of 
this ultimate reality, but not a nihilism as it is experienced by Nietzsche. Nietzsche 
experiences nihilism as ‘nothing’, not as the counterpart of something; he experiences 
nihilism in the pure sense of conceptualized emptiness of nothingness. Heidegger on 
the other hand understands essence of Nietzsche’s thinking as something negative, as 
nihil, hence it becomes the concealing character of Being. The nihilism understood as 
the conceptualized emptiness of nothingness does not realize that the dividend 
exploring character of ‘nihil’ is also to be understood as an antonym of non-nihil 
(Heidegger 1986, 44). That is why Heidegger says, nihilism means, the essential 
incomprehension of the essence of nothingness and Nietzsche, the last metaphysical 
thinker, is caught in metaphysics and consequently not able to realise that nihil is an 
antonym of non-nihil. 
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 In its essence Śūnya-vāda can perhaps compared with the theory of relativity, that 
there is no thing, no phenomenon to be experienced or fixed. The absolute is 
independent character of its own Sva-bhāva, hence also beyond the Nāma-rūpa, i.e., 
beyond any phenomenal description, which should be unconditionally true. Then 
there is nothing, metal or non-mental, which can be considered as real. Does this 
assumption mean that there is ‘nothing’, and the universe is understood in term of 
‘nihil’, that even the values are not? In the sense of this ontological exploration S. N. 
Dasgupta (1998) is very accurate in assuming that Sankara’s Brahman was very much 
like the Śūnya of Nāgārjuna. For, it is difficult indeed to distinguish between pure 
being and pure non-being as a category (Dasgupta & Mohanta 1998, 353). 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
The Advaita thinking can be claimed as metaphysical and the Buddhist thinking can 
be understood as nihilistic; nevertheless they strike a chord of hidden ontological 
possibilities, exactly the hermeneutic of Being. On the other hand, to experience the 
revealing and concealing aspects of Being in the thinking of Advaita and Buddhism 
demands an ontological destruction comparable to Heidegger’s destruction of western 
ontology (Heidegger 2001, 2-3), so that the experience of Being may come to its 
phenomenological light, because the experience of those hermeneutic features of 
Being lays hidden in Indian thinking. But for a keen observer this hidden ontological 
experience is evident in various passages of Upanishads, such as Upanishads ask 
towards the ‘Sat’ of the Brahman. In such an expression, the ‘Sat’ is conceived 
independently of the divine principle of creation; consequently the hermeneutic of 
Being becomes explicit. To research such hidden possibilities and explore them is the 
intended obligation of this work; in the words of Heidegger, it is the destruction of 
conventional understanding of ontology; and every destruction intends and 
subsequently encloses a construction. 
 In the realm of the hermeneutic of Being, the Śūnya-vāda of Nāgārjuna and 
Śankara’s understanding of Brahman are non-different; rather they are one and the 
same! What is explicit in the thinking of Nāgārjuna is then nothing, but the 
expression of Being as “nihil”. In the history of Being, Being that bears his 
concealment with itself, hides itself in Nietzsche’s thinking, as nihil. Heidegger 
understands nihilism as a thinking, in which Being becomes explicit as nihil, as the 
essence of Being, i.e., Being carries its oblivion with itself (Heidegger, 1980, 265). 
Hence the nihilism emerges itself as the concealing of Being in the thinking of Being 
and subsequently proclaims that with Being is also nothing, for, the nihilism as 
“nihil” does not realize that the “nihil” is to be also understood as an antonym of non-
nihil (Heidegger 1986, 44). This is Heidegger’s the thinking of Being; that Being is 
understood as “something” as well as “nothing”, and subsequently is characterized 
with “revealing” as well as “concealing” features. The exploration of Śūnya in the 
thinking of Nāgārjuna becomes ontologically similar to Heidegger’s understanding of 
nihilism. The reality is considered to be ‘something’ that shows the essence of 
existential certainty, where the counterpart of the same is also inherent. Ontologically 
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this comes increasingly closer to the understanding of the revealing and concealing 
character of ‘α-λήθεια’. 
 However, it is also to be noted that there is no watertight metaphysical distinction 
in Indian thinking as Heidegger discovers the dividend explored dichotomy of Being 
in western metaphysics. Nevertheless the hermeneutic of Being as nihil and 
something is integrated in Indian context. The western metaphysics is condemned by 
Heidegger, not because it deals with summum bonum, but because it understands 
Being as two dividend explored opposites of something and nothing. This may not be 
the absolute fact in Indian thinking, that we can find the thinking of something is 
integrated in the Śūnya of Nāgārjuna and the thinking of nihil is also integrated in the 
Nirguna-Brahman of Advaita. Still both of them represent somehow the hermeneutic 
of nihil and something respectively. Just as the concept of Śūnya of Nāgārjuna, the 
absolute reality [Paramārtha-sattā] of Advaita, which is known as Brahman goes 
beyond the reach of all concepts and conventions and remains un-contradicted. For 
this absolute reality, the Madhyamakas use the term ‘advaya’, whereas the Advaitins 
use the term ‘advaita’ and both surprisingly enough mean that the absolute is ‘non-
dual’(Dasgupta & Mohanta 1998, 354). 
 According to Heidegger, the comparisons as well as translations are always the 
explanations, i.e., they are the modes of transmission or deceptive appearance; 
therefore this attempt as any other comparative study is also not free of any such 
transmission, especially, when we discuss the thinking Śankara and Nāgārjuna under 
the set standards of western ontology and metaphysics. It is also to be noted, that any 
distinctive attempt to set a thinking under given standards and subsequently to 
compare with another thinking gives the impression that is still metaphysical. 
Likewise if we ask, what is the recognizable distinction between something and nihil, 
between Brahman and Śūnya, then between Being and thinking, it is still 
metaphysical, because, to assert the distinction means to categorize under distinctive 
order; and any ontological research on ‘belonging-together’ must go beyond such 
metaphysical categorization. Here the conception of Śūnya emerges having 
tremendous significance, as an attempt to go beyond the apparent metaphysical 
tendencies in Śankara’s thinking. This work is not an attempt to compare or to 
classify two different thinking, but to understand the hermeneutic of the thinking of 
Being in its intercultural context and depth. In such an understanding the 
metaphysical distinction gets dissolved; the hermeneutic of ‘belonging-together’ 
stands beyond the terms, language and culture. This hermeneutic of ‘belonging-
together’ provides the foundation to ask the question of Being in Indian thinking, 
even if, there is no specified synonym for the western ontological term ‘Being’ in 
Indian thinking. The fascinating ontological aspects in the thinking Śankara and 
Nāgārjuna, subsequently in the thinking of Heidegger are based exclusively on this 
hermeneutic of “beloging-together”. Of course, it is not about discovering the 
complete essence of equality or the total difference, but paying attention to the basic 
hermeneutic features, which make these two remote ways of thinking in the realm of 
Being comparable, without making the uniqueness of a thinking in the other dissolved. 
Hence, it is all about discovering the hidden ontological possibilities, which are 
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covered by the ordinary modes of language, culture and further the science. Such an 
attempt finds its essential expansion in the field of hermeneutics and expresses the 
essence of any comparative attempt in thinking. 
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